for regulators to interact pro-actively with industry so as to perform and uphold their mandates, in particular through the development of "regulatory technology" or "RegTech".
The final section seeks to provide a framework to understand how a balancing between financial technology and regulation can be achieved.
FinTech: New Term for an Old Sector
At the broadest level, FinTech refers to the application of technology to finance. This definition gives rise to three specific observations. First, FinTech is not an inherently novel development for the financial services industry.
Indeed, the introduction of the telegraph (first commercial use in 1838) 8 The most important financial innovation that I have seen the past 20 years is the automatic teller machine, that really helps people and prevents visits to the bank and it is a real convenience.
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Second, the financial services industry has been one of the prime purchasers of IT products and services globally, with total spending at over US$ 197 billion in 2014. 12 This is not a recent trend and dates back to the mid-1990s, when the financial services industry became the single largest purchaser of IT, a position it retains to this day. Thus, for at least twenty years, traditional financial services have been a driving force in the IT industry and this trend is not slowing as the industry is in fact predicted to double its IT spending. 13 Since the late 1980s, finance has been an industry based upon transmission and manipulation of digital information. The ATM in fact is often the only point for most consumers today at which finance transitions from a purely digital experience to one that involves a physical commodity (i.e. cash).
Third, the term FinTech is not confined to specific sectors (e.g. financing) or business models (e.g. peer-to-peer (P2P) lending), but instead covers the entire scope of services and products traditionally provided by the financial services industry, a topic discussed in greater detail in section 4.
This historical perspective, however, does not explain the reason for the increase in activity and rising concerns of policy-makers 14 or the industry itself. 15 As "FinTech" is not a new story, its opportunities, risks and legal implications should not be novel; and, such is the case, 19 Indeed, one can make the argument that paper is a technology that allows to store value. The same size bank note can "store" US$10 or US$100 and be worth this much as long as there is a state or central bank guaranteeing the bearer of the note to be paid. Thus the amount written on the bank note itself has theoretically no limit, indeed Zimbabwe is (in)famously known for have a Z$ 100 trillion (100,000,000,000,000) bank note. 20 On the accounting side, the blockchain technology is akin to the double entry book keeping system, as any transaction processed via the blockchain is registered and sent to the whole network which can then be reaccessed for auditing purposes. Importantly and unlike traditional book keeping, because blockchain accounting is decentralized the capacity to fake a transaction is very complicated as it would require to amend the record on the whole blockchain network, which is not only complicated but very costly and thus may remove the economic rational of the fraud. 
The modern foundations: 1967-1987
The launch of the calculator and the ATM in 1967 began the modern period of FinTech 1.0.
1967-1987 was a time when financial services moved from an analogue to a digital industry. This time lag highlights the delay in regulatory reaction to technological changes. This lag is to be expected, and often welcomed as it is consistent with efficient market regulation.
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There is limited benefit in regulating all new innovations applicable to the financial sector.
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Pre-emptive regulation would not only increase the workload of regulatory agencies and tend to stifle innovation severely, but would also have limited benefits. Therefore, regulatory reaction is to be expected and can arguably be beneficial in allowing the emergence of a new industry or channel.
The regulatory view during FinTech 2.0 was that whilst e-banking was simply a digital version of the traditional brick and mortar banking model, it did create new risks. By providing direct and virtually unlimited access to their accounts, technology removed the necessity for depositors to be physically present at a branch to withdraw funds. Indirectly, this could facilitate electronic bank runs as the lack of physical interaction removes the friction from a withdrawal. In turn this can increase the stress on a financial institution that has liquidity problems during a banking crisis:
38 David Carse, "Keynote: Regulatory Framework of e-banking" (8 October 1999) HKMA, available at <http://www.bis.org/review/r991012c.pdf> 39 For more details on this point please see section 6.2 40 In this respect, it is useful to compare Hong Kong to the Singaporean approach. Indeed, whilst the Octopus Card Network (contactless store value facility) has been mainly developed by the private sector, its Singaporean equivalent ENZ-Link was pushed as the standard by the government. In other words, whilst Hong Kong regulators tend to be more technology agnostic, Singapore seems to be driven more by a top-down vision on the use of technology within the country. This observation would also echo the current developments within FinTech whereby Singapore has been much more public as to the government initiatives in that space (e.g. US$ 225million to be invested in research to 75% of operating cost of FinTech accelerators subsidized).
An internet-based bank is faced with the same types of banking risk as its traditional counterparties. In some ways, the internet may heighten these risks. For example, the ability to transfer funds between different bank accounts may increase deposit volatility and could, in extreme situations, lead to "virtual bank runs". Banks will need to build this possibility into their liquidity management policies.
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Regulators also identified that online banking creates new credit risks. Through the removal of the physical link between the consumer and the bank, it was anticipated that competition would increase (e.g. borrowers would have access to a greater pool of lenders as they were no longer limited to a specific geographical location). Whilst prima facie positive for consumers, this competitive pressure may also be problematic from a financial stability point of view.
The US provided a telling example of this with the deregulation of its banking market during the 1980s. 42 Second, the constraints arising from being known personally by a loan officer are lost as the loan origination decision may be replaced by an automated system.
On the beneficial side, it was rightly noted that better organized data could lead to an improved understanding of the borrowers' true credit risk and allow the offering of products better aligned to the risk profile of the consumer. This insight pre-empted the emergence of big-data analysis that provides more granular insights into consumers' profiles. 43 However, the comparison stops here, because Carse's speech was built on the premise that these technological innovations would be used by licensed financial intuitions only. This distinction is key to understanding the turning point between FinTech 2.0 and FinTech 3.0.
41 David Carse, "Keynote: Regulatory Framework of e-banking" (8 October 1999) HKMA, page 4 <http://www.bis.org/review/r991012c.pdf> 42 The preamble of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act [1980] "provides for the gradual elimination of all limitations on the rates of interest". In practice this meant that interest payable on deposits was now freely set by the market as opposed to being capped by regulations. The purpose of this legislation was to allow for retail banks to compete more equally with Money Market Funds (MMF) that increasingly attracted consumers' deposits, given the better return. However, it also had the unintended consequence of removing the bank's guaranteed profit generated by the spread between interest payable (e.g. deposits) and chargeable (e.g. loans). In turn this forced banks to make up for the loss in revenue, previously guaranteed by the cap of interest rates, by shifting towards higher risk activities (e.g. sub-prime lending) or moving away from interest-based income (e.g. fees generated by loan securitization). 43 This vision of a data-led regulatory system is not new. During this FinTech 2.0 period, the expectation was that the providers of e-banking solutions would be supervised financial institutions. Indeed, the use of the term "bank" in most jurisdictions is restricted to companies duly authorized or regulated as financial institutions. . 47 It is recognized that regulators in China (e.g. CBRC and PBOC) are due to announce new rules around the P2P industry mainly around credit-worthiness checks and regulatory capital requirements.
For over 1.2 billion unbanked individuals, this factor is weak, as to them banking may well be a commodity that can be provided by any institution, whether regulated or not.
In other words, in developing markets there may well be a lack of "behavioral legacies" 48 whereby the public expects that only banks can provide financial services. For these populations, "banking is essentials, banks are not," as it was rightly captured by Bill Gates in 1994. 
FinTech and the Global Financial Crisis: Evolution or revolution?
The financial crisis has had two major impacts in terms of public perception and human capital. First, as the origin of the financial crisis became more widely understood, the public perception of banks deteriorated. For example, predatory lending methods targeting 48 The term "behavioural legacies" echoes the "IT legacy systems" of banks that prevent them to fully digitize their process given the fact that their system are too-old-to-upgrade and too-expensive-to-replace. Indeed, until now most of banks IT spending was in maintenance as opposed to upgrade, however this gradually changing. 49 
From post crisis regulation to FinTech 3.0
These new regulatory obligations (e.g. Dodd Frank Act, Basel 3) are welcome in light of the social and economic impact of the financial crisis. It is now unlikely that the next financial crisis will be prompted by the same causes and impact the public is comparable ways. 56 Yet, these post-crisis reforms had the unintended consequence of spurring the rise of new technological players and limiting the capacity of banks to compete. The JOBs Act did not have the specific purpose of supporting FinTech 3.0, because it applied to start-ups in general. These alternative funding sources became available at a time that coincided with, on the one hand, increased regulatory pressures that limited banks' capacity to innovate, and, on the other hand, with a public perception of traditional banks and human talent outflow, which provided the necessary market and knowledge for new FinTech startups to emerge.
In summary, the financial services industry since 2008 has been affected by a "perfect storm", financial, political and public in its source, allowing for a new generation of market participants to establish a new paradigm known today as "FinTech".
The FinTech industry today: A topology
On the basis of this evolutionary analysis, it is possible to develop a comprehensive typology for the FinTech industry. FinTech today comprises five major areas: (1) finance and investment, (2) operations and risk management, (3) payments and infrastructure, (4) data security and monetization, and (5) customer interface. In addition to these is the use of technology in regulation itself, the subject of Section 6 below. it has become clear that the stability of the financial system is a national security issue. The digitized nature of the financial industry means it is particularly vulnerable to cybercrime and espionage, with the latter increasingly important in geopolitics. This digitization and consequent vulnerability is the result of decades of development, highlighted in previous sections, and, going forward, will remain a major concern for governments, policymakers, regulators and industry participants, as well as customers. 59 At the same time, FinTech innovation is clearly present in the uses to which "big data" can be applied to enhance the efficiency and availability of financial services. The potential for opportunity needs to be balanced with the challenges specific to the market and the region. Investors and networks in APAC are less sophisticated than in developed Western markets. There are large information asymmetries in market activity. Second, financing is not readily attainable, as there are high barriers to entry to retail banking (e.g. regulatory capital requirements, ownership structures, and market restrictions). Furthermore, as companies scale, the fragmented regulatory regime puts B2C FinTech companies at a disadvantage compared with B2B companies, particularly those that sell to banks, as they partially shift the compliance burden to the client.
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The fragmented regime in APAC is also apparent when compared to Europe (24 countries in APAC compared to one harmonized market). Finally, financial engineering in APAC is less sophisticated than in the EU and US markets, which constrains certain FinTech companies.
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For example, robo-advisory platforms on wealth management build portfolios for clients with small amounts of money. However, the level of tranching of financial products in the region
is not yet at a level that allows for efficient "micro-portfolio" creation led by algorithms. The benefits of internet finance companies require consideration. Alibaba has fulfilled two main government policy objectives by creating 2.87 million direct and indirect job opportunities, and providing over 400,000 SMEs with loans ranging from $3,000 to $5,000.
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Regulators need to strike a difficult but important balance in the current competitive dynamic between banks and internet finance companies.
China has been gradually reforming its financial system since 1978. However, the Global Yu'E Bao is a service that offers Alipay customers the possibilities to invest their idle cash in money market funds. Those accounts are redeemable on demand and pay higher interest on "deposit" held. 75 For example, by simplifying and changing certain regulatory constrains under which they operate (or alternatively by bringing internet finance companies under the same set of rules). However, the latter option might decrease the financial efficiency and inclusion gains brought by technology as compliance costs will increase. 76 In The result of this mismatch between physical and digital infrastructure means the future for digital financial services in China is particularly bright. Already China UnionPay has, in under 15 years, become the world's largest payments provider. 87 The lack of physical infrastructure and of customer expectations regarding banking constitutes an opportunity, which could see the development in China of a new paradigm in banking. The trend toward digital banking is already underway. Over the past three years in China, there have been 111 million new Internet banking customers, a 19% increase in new personal bank accounts, and a 24% increase in online payments. 88 In addition, it is expected that by 2020 there will be 900 million digital banking customers, compared to 380 million in 2012. 89 Likewise, it is expected that by 2017 over 900 million Chinese will be credit scored by the new credit bureau, Sesame Credit Management, part of Alibaba, using alternative data points.
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Going forward, one should expect that the tension between traditional digital financial services and FinTech 3.0 providers will be greatest around the following three areas: (1) payments, (2) financing, and (3) deposits, with the last of these being the strongest contention point (and perhaps the main threshold for strong regulation).
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To support this digital financial transition, a framework must achieve various goals for each actor in the financial sector. Regulators must secure the necessary understanding and scope of operations to oversee the use of technology within the financial industry. Banks should compete equally in terms of regulatory burden with FinTech 3.0 companies which offer exact or close substitutes for regulated products. At the same time, start-ups need to operate within a regulatory framework that allows them to develop their business before becoming subject to expensive compliance costs.
Thus, the way forward may not necessarily lie in setting rules for financial products, but instead may lie in establishing threshold levels for when institutions need to comply with conduct rules for small actors, or prudential rules for larger players. This may avoid burdensome regulation with heavy compliance costs and limited benefits for financial stability. This would also help establish a boundary of operation between banks and internet finance companies and determine whether the distinction is based on products or transaction size. 90 See Andrew Foxwell, "Asia loses out as FinTech start-ups head to the West" (2 June 2015) Asian Investor, available at <http://www.asianinvestor.net/News/397928,asia-loses-out-as-fintech-start-ups-head-to-thewest.aspx>. It is important to note that these individuals may have already been credit scored by traditional credit bureaus. However their true risk might have not been fully assesses due to the lack off sufficient data points (e.g. financial transactions perform within formal banking sector). These are called "thin credit files" by the industry and provide FinTech 3.0 companies large opportunities, the US and EU equivalent of Sesame Credit Management being Credit Karma and Kreditech. 91 To date, deposit taking activities have not been approached by FinTech 3.0 start-ups. This reflects the fact that it is one of the most regulated activities within the financial services industry as it requires a banking licence. In turn this removes much of the economic rationale behind performing this function since the fact of holding deposits on its own generates little of no return. This would push start-ups to create two products from day one so as to up-sell products and services to make up for the cost generated by their deposit business.
In this respect, it seems that China's current Internet Finance Guidelines and the consultation on third party payments which is due to be released before this year's end 92 Jack Ma, founder and CEO of Alibaba, rightly captured this difference when he said:
There are two big opportunities in future financial industry. One is online banking, all financial institutions go online; the other one is internet finance, which is purely led by outsiders. 93 Regionally this is echoed in the development of tiered licensing systems in Asia, with governments in the region developing "light license" models that aim to minimize regulatory and compliance costs for firms seeking to deliver specific banking activities to certain population segments. For example, South Korea is developing a specific regime for onlineonly banks, 94 India has created a new license type for payment banks 95 and has recently issued 11 new banking licenses 96 and China is introducing new private banks to cater for market sectors traditionally underserved by state-owned banks. 97 These developments matter because they reflect the FinTech dynamic of the region and indicate a regulatory policy that favors the development of specific sub-sectors to promote national policy objectives.
Africa: Greenfield opportunities for FinTech
Africa shares many characteristics with the APAC region in terms of FinTech development, however, the nature and direction of the primary developments in this area in Africa have been somewhat different. The reach of banks in Africa is even more circumscribed than in Asia. At most 20% of African households have any access to formal or semi-formal financial services as compared to some 60% of households in Asia. 98 As a result, telecommunications companies, rather than banks, have tended to take the lead in FinTech developments in the region. Mobile money, the provision of basic payment and savings services by a creation of e-money recorded on a mobile phone, while initially pioneered in the Philippines has achieved its greatest success in Kenya and, more recently, Tanzania. In both of these countries the rise and extent of mobile money has assisted economic development significantly by providing customers with a means to save funds, remit money safely to their families, pay bills, and receive government payments safely and securely.
The most well-known success story in Africa is that of M-Pesa, the mobile money product of Safaricom, which was launched by Vodafone in 2007. In under five years payments made through the platform surpassed 43% of Kenya's GDP 99 and the central bank is now having to supervise the provider carefully as the payments platform has become systemically significant.
Indeed the phenomenal success of M-Pesa has caused problems in many other countries, where companies offering mobile money services need to have as the screen saver on every corporate computer screen a prominent warning: "Be aware -we are not in Kenya" for many other countries have had to learn that merely replicating what was done in Kenya does not necessarily lead to similar customer take-up of digital financial services. For digital financial services (DFS) to prosper, the services offered have to be tightly tailored to local needs.
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Meeting the needs of the local consumers, whatever they may be, is the key requirement for success in providing DFS -and this is not the starting point for many of the people designing the DFS products coming, as they most often do, from an IT background. Business Insider, available at <http://uk.businessinsider.com/the-25-fintech-unicorns-ranked-by-value-2015-7?utm_content=buffer05d0a&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer> 103 The counterargument is that if FinTech start-ups are created by ex-finance professionals they should understand regulated markets with compliance cultures. This is highlighted by looking at where FinTech companies are founded. Start-ups close to financial centers such as New York, London or Hong Kong tend to have stronger compliance cultures than those in other locations such as Silicon Valley where the founders are more likely to be engineers than finance professionals.
solutions. The solution is to be found in devising an approach that balances the views of each party (e.g. the technology industry, financial actors and regulators) and is proportionate to their obligations. Performing this balancing act requires one to understand the raison d'etre of regulators and the reasons behind the rules they enforce and to provide education for for start-ups on their regulatory obligations.
Regulatory objectives and thresholds
Regulators' objectives can be understood by their key mandates. In no specific order, these are: (1) financial stability, (2) prudential Regulation, (3) conduct and fairness, and (4) competition and market development. Furthermore the issue of when to regulate can be as important as what to regulate, so that some rules may not be enforced until certain specific thresholds are met. This was seen in Section 2.2.1 in the regulation of e-banking which existed for about 20 years before it was properly regulated.
Earlier regulation may well have represented substantial wasted effort. E-banking was introduced in 1980 in the US but stopped shortly thereafter, before being reinstated successfully in 1995 in the UK. E-banking is a good example of why regulators should move slowly in regulating innovations. Regulators diverting their resources to understand every new technological innovation could result in inefficient outcomes for regulators and industry.
First, technology needs time to find its final use and applicability, and the market may need to settle before regulatory intervention. 104 Second, the availability alone of a technology does not mean it will be widely adopted. 105 Third, there may be a strong benefit in regulatory measures not influencing market innovation or technological standards. Indeed, regulators should remain technology-neutral.
In practice, this means regulators need to categorize and understand the benefits and applicability of a technology. For example, new biometric identification mechanisms entering the market (e.g. fingerprint and iris scanning, voice or heartbeat recognition) raise different case-specific issues, but are all used for the same purpose of customer identification.
Finger print scanning appears to be the simplest and most widely used biometric identification method. However, it raises issues of "biometric data theft" where a fingerprint can be replicated using a simple high resolution photograph. 106 This risk recently materialized, when 5.6 million finger prints were stolen from the US defense department.
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A case can thus be made against using fingerprints due to the security risk. bank VAR models), and thus regulators could take comfort from knowing they had a point of contact for when they decided to look at the legal implications of specific technologies.
This approach can be cost-effective for regulators, and industry, as it experiment with initiatives until they become sufficiently important to attract regulatory scrutiny.
From an industry and regulatory perspective, the pharmaceutical industry perhaps offers a blueprint for regulating innovation. This industry is, similarly to financial services, highly Yu'E Bao shows how a non-traditional financial institution went from "too-small-to-care" to As for the rule-based approach, the fact that the compliance obligations are clearly set out can limit the incentive of the supervised entity to do more because the obligations are perceived as sufficiently comprehensive.
116 Ibid. p. 7. 117 Ibid.
There is nonetheless a way of resolving the differences between not only principle and rulebased regulatory approaches, but also between traditional financial institutions (FinTech 2.0) and start-ups (FinTech 3.0). The solution may lie in going beyond a strict reading of the text so that regulatory approaches, whether rule-based or principle-based, are not seen as mutually exclusive.
For example, whilst a principle-based approach may provide a start-up with the benefit of flexibility at an early stage, this may create limitations in terms of scalability of a business.
Regulatory clarity and certainty are not only important for large institutions but also for investors into start-ups. 118 For start-ups, the legal predictability and higher compliance costs associated with a rule-based model may be balanced by being more attractive to investors.
Then, as the start-up matures, so does its compliance culture and capacity as it has increasing access to sufficient financial resources. The higher costs and complexity associated with a rule-based approached can thus be understood as a benefit, both for the company and the investor. Indeed, rules-based regulatory approaches are more likely to create a barrier to entry for subsequent new competitors. 119 The regulatory obligations of a company should be dynamic in the sense they need to adapt to the size and activity of a business as it grows and changes. 120 The P2P industry offers a case study. Many businesses start as a platform as agents introducing lenders to borrowers and are not involved in the loan itself. This is important for P2P debt FinTech 3.0 start-ups because it means they may have limited regulatory obligations. However, this operational model also limits their capacity to scale as it relies on always being able to match the exact needs of a borrower with the liquidity of a lender. From a risk angle, the matching also exposes the lender to the direct credit risk of the borrower. Since the platform is only an agent as opposed to a principal, it is not responsible for any losses resulting from a partial or complete default.
This shifting of risk towards the lender has two consequences. First, if an increasing amount of lender(s) lose their capital as a result of a badly evaluated credit risk, their confidence in the platform will fall and they will not likely re-use it. 121 Second, the risk profile of such a liquidity placement on a P2P platform is much higher given that the risk is directly passed on to the lender. As a result, this limits the number of potential lenders since the increase in return is accompanied by an increase in risk.
Therefore, for P2P lending platforms to maintain user confidence and attract a wider lender base, it may well be necessary to move away from a purely agent-based model and instead come principal-based model. 122 Alternatively, the platform may wish to spread the credit risk of the borrower by originating a loan using the liquidity of various lenders. This limits the credit risk of each lender to its chosen contribution. Additionally, the ease (e.g. convenience and speed) of borrowing over P2P platforms and the lack of co-ordination among platforms is creating a risk of over indebtedness among borrowers.
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The P2P sector offers a good example of how regulation needs to proceed carefully when creating rules for an industry. 124 Industry demands may represent nothing more than a snapshot in time of their difficulties and may fail to address the evolving nature of their business as it grows in terms of market size and risk. 122 There have been reports that in order to maintain confidence in P2P platforms in China, the platform owners would pay any incurred default to the lenders. Whilst this is something that can be done if the platform is cash rich, given health interest spread they retain, it can also be a hint towards the start of a Ponzi scheme challenging the ultimate viability and raises problems of fraud. See Wang Shenlu, Liu Ran and Yang Lu "P2P lenders heading into Dangerous Waters, critics say" (18 April 2014) Caixin, available at <http://english.caixin.com/2014-04-18/100667283.html> 123 See Michael Corkery "Pitfalls for unwary borrower out on the frontier of Banking" (13 Sept 2015) The New York Times, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/14/business/dealbook/pitfalls-for-the-unwaryborrower-out-on-the-frontiers-of-banking.html?_r=0> 124 In that context, the US is still waiting for majors amendments to the JOBS Act, which depending on the outcome may facilitate the growth of equity crowd-funding platform. However and until then PE investors are not investing in these platforms until they receive regulatory certainty as to the compliance status of their future platform. Thus regulation can similarly be seen as a technology that allows businesses to scale, or not. for Economic and Risk Analysis, to look at using data insights for better regulation; and Peppet published a paper on "smart mortgages" that use data to limit the default risks. The effort and resources regulators are putting into understanding the FinTech sector is perhaps surprising, particularly as they are to some extent revisiting the same questions and risks identified over 15 years ago with e-banking. Furthermore, apart from specific products (e.g. robo-advisory), the business models of FinTech companies are not radically different from their traditional counterparts (e.g. P2P lending emanating from shadow banking in China). 133 At most, the efficiency is driven by lower overhead costs, or disintermediation. To some extent FinTech is going full circle and providing only incremental changes, both from industry and regulatory perspectives.
Real-time compliance and RegTech
As discussed above, the financial sector has been the largest spender on IT systems for decades, a trend likely to continue, especially in respect to regulatory and compliance spending. In the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the regulatory onus and level of scrutiny by regulators has dramatically increased. Indeed, regulators have moved towards a risk-based approach where access to data is key to prudential supervision. Gutierez has analyzed how data is playing an increasing role in ensuring financial institutions are held accountable for their actions, and their responsibility is quickly established. 134 This appears to be a laudable development. 135 For financial institutions all of this regulatory activity has meant cost increases, whether in terms of capital (e.g. Basel 3), operations (e.g. human resources), or penalties (e.g. HSBC, UBS, etc.). On the last point alone, since 2008, banks in the west have been fined over US$242 billion. 136 Arguably, both industry and regulators share an interest in reducing fraud.
A range of stakeholders are interested in increasing transparency and creating monitoring processes. In June 2015 the Bank of England issued its Fair and Effective market review, looking at the role that technology may play in compliance, 137 noting that:
Firms have started to make progress in response to the limitations of existing surveillance solutions, including the use of new technology and analytics which go beyond the key-word surveillance and simple statistical checks previously used by firms to detect improper trading activity and discussed earlier in this section. 138 In particular, the Bank of England highlighted the following added values for regulation of specific technologies:
139 to drive up the price of a particular asset), front running and wash trades, using predefined patterns of trading behaviour;
 "Big data" techniques, which typically use a far larger number of inputs than standard surveillance techniques, helping to straddle information silos. The algorithms used have the potential to detect a wider range of suspicious activity than pattern analysis, and can also be used to identify networks of trading and communications activity which may themselves identify vulnerabilities;
 Predictive coding, which looks to identify patterns of activity, such as unusual use of communication, non-routine patterns of leaving the office, non-completion of training, or missing mandatory leave, which may flag potential conduct concerns, and  Digitalization of voice communications, which some firms claim has the potential to be more effective than analysing written communications.
As a result, the argument for cost reduction within the compliance sector is very strong, and
RegTech has never looked so beneficial for firms. Yet, one also needs to be balanced in assessing what is currently feasible when it comes to fully automating regulatory and compliance systems.
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Before looking at the conversion of compliance obligations into IT processes the first question is more fundamental -how should financial technology itself be regulated? 141 To date the debate, especially in Asia, seems to be more on understanding what framework provides the right balance between market innovation and market confidence.
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Furthermore, whilst in the West RegTech has been developed much more by regulators (the UK government dedicated a chapter of the Blackett Review 143 to the topic and Europe is pushing towards increased data transparency with PSD2) in practice there are still uncertainties, as reported by Brummer and Gorfine, as to whether or not principle-based approaches are better suited than rule-based approaches. 144 To understand regulator's activity, one needs to look at two factors. First, at the macro level their interest reflects the need to guide the transition occurring in financial markets. Just as an abrupt transition towards liberalized financial markets can be detrimental for participants and consumers, so can a fast technological transition create new risks. For example, the simplification and automation of wealth management services into color-coded advisers, 145 provides a simpler and cheaper solution for end-users. However, this also creates new risks as it moves away from a full disclosure regime and threatens jobs within the industry.
At the micro level, the increasingly data-driven aspects of FinTech 3.0 and the fact that these young companies rely on new and transparent IT systems allows them to explore new compliance mechanisms. 146 For example, real-time compliance systems could be requested as part of the licensing process. This would provide regulators and the company with a way to monitor in quasi-real time the actions of its staff and identify any non-compliant behaviour.
In that scenario the firm wins because it limits its risk of misconduct and so does the regulator with better regulatory outcomes. 
Conclusion
This paper has illustrated the evolution of FinTech through three major eras, culminating in today's FinTech 3.0, characterized by new competition and diversity, bringing both opportunities and risks to be carefully considered.
In developed markets, this shift to FinTech 3.0 has emerged out of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and been driven by public expectations and demands, the movement of technology companies into the financial world and political demands for a more diversified banking system. In contrast, in developing countries and particularly Asia, FinTech 3.5 has been driven by the needs of development and the inefficiencies in the existing financial system, combined with the rapid introduction and reach of new technology, particularly mobile communications.
In both cases, the development of the FinTech sector is attracting the interest of regulators who are currently evaluating the best ways to support market developments, while ensuring the development of the sector contributes to, and does not threaten, core mandates such as systemic stability, consumer protection and market competition The challenge lies in resolving the tension between having a flexible, forward-looking framework that promotes innovation, and the framework being clear enough to maintain market, consumer and investor confidence.
There seem to be two approaches in that respect. On the one hand, the UK in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis has changed its regulatory structure, moving away from a productbased to a principle-based approach, focusing on prudential regulation and consumer protection. China, on the other hand, has maintained product-based principles but is gradually introducing a two-tiered system where small to medium transactions can be handled by internet finance companies, while larger transactions remain in the remit of (State-owned) institutional players. 
